The parliamentarization of presidentialism

The non-anticipated democratic sustainability of coalition-based presidentialism begs the question about what makes it function. In this paper we argue that political scientists are ill equipped to answer this puzzle with analytical tools provided by the received wisdom about constitutional design. This recent development is welcome given that multiparty presidentialism has become the modal form of presidential democracy, especially in Latin America. Until the 1980s, the received wisdom about constitutional design had it that two party parliamentary systems were superior to its alternatives, namely, presidentialism and multi-party parliamentary systems. Comparativists over half a century seemed to have shared this view of coalitions. Strong presidents in multiparty systems were the black beasts of constitutional design experts. Research on presidentialism followed a similar path from open criticism to a mixed view of the “perils of presidentialism.” While a more nuanced view of presidentialism appeared in Shugart and Carey’s seminal work, recent scholarship has argued that government formation under presidentialism and parliamentarism shares the same underlying institutional logic. Recent developments in Latin America has given support not only to the general argument that coalition government is both viable and functional but also to the more controversial claim that strong presidents under multipartism may be a precondition for effective government. What explains the unanticipated success of multiparty presidentialism, or parlieemntariszation of presidentialism? We argue that three factors help explain why this constitutional arrangement is both feasible and functional: the powers of presidents, the existence of tradable coalition goods (pork, ministerial portfolios, among others) and the strength of institutional checks on the executive’s discretion. Good governance is conditional on the delegation of extensive powers to both presidents and autonomous institutions that checks on the executives.