Conflict and consensus among elite economists in the state: Network structures and competition for influence in Mexico and Argentina

Economists occupying high-level positions in state bureaucracies play an important role in shaping macroeconomic and financial policies in Latin America and other developing countries.  However, the nature of this role varies cross-nationally.  In this paper, I illustrate and explain the very different policy-making dynamics in two countries, Mexico and Argentina.  In Mexico, macroeconomic policy-making has been based on consensus, conformism and cooperation among bureaucratic elites in central banks and finance ministries, a majority of whom hold advanced degrees in economics.  In Argentina, in contrast, despite the prevalence of similar professional backgrounds, policy-making has been conflictual, competitive and characterized by an absence of intra-elite dialogue.  The proximate explanation for these differences is the varying structure of the professional networks of bureaucratic elites.  Using data on the network ties among bureaucrats in Mexico and Argentina from 1982 through 2010, I show that Mexican elite networks are more cohesive than their Argentine counterparts.  The structure of these networks, in turn, is explained by the different party structures, bureaucratic recruitment and promotion mechanisms, and patterns of elite competition for policy influence in these two countries.  In Mexico, the one-party state existent during roughly 70 years created fertile conditions for the emergence of a cohesive bureaucratic elite.  Remarkably, however, this elite became independent of the partisan conditions that helped create it, and was able to continue to assert its control over key bureaucracies following the demise of the Institutional Revolutionary Party in the 2000 elections.  In Argentina, alternation of power between both parties and intra-party factions, as well as recruitment practices based on the concept of the “economic team,” have given rise to a fragmented elite network.  By illustrating these political, organizational, and network dynamics, this study contributes to the sociological understanding of professional knowledge as a form of political power.