Industrial democracy versus union democracy? Organizational responses to the reform of the trade union recognition process in France

The French Labor movement is currently facing an important transformation of the industrial relations system. Since August, 2008, union recognition is based on the results of the elections for works councils’ representatives, instead of being given by legal provisions. Whereas several Trade Unions opposed the reform, the main Labor and Employers organizations (CGT and CFDT on one side, MEDEF and CGPME on the other) supported it, for they saw it as a means for union revitalization and the reinforcement of industrial democracy. What are the consequences of that legal reform on trade union practices and repertoires of action? More specifically, does that change regarding the game rules of industrial relations affect union democracy? Based on a two-year, collective research based on monographs, our paper will address that question in two steps.

First, we will describe how trade unions, both at the workplace and geographical level, do or do not develop innovative tactics and devices in order to tackle the electoral process and its consequences. Thus, we will question whether the reform actually works as an external leverage for union development, especially towards groups of workers not represented yet. We will stress the fact that trade unionists adjust to the new legal framework by interpreting it with the cognitive frames and practical tools they are provided with, notably through each specific union organizational culture. Second, we will analyze how new tactics and devices shape the deliberative and decision-making process within unions. In particular, we will question whether the new electoral constraint leads to an increased rationalization, professionalization or even “managerialization” of French trade unions. In that way, we will study how the reform, in return, indirectly alters organizational cultures.