Governing second housing: Three case studies in Brazil, Spain and Switzerland

More than a growing tourism modality, second housing has become a common way of accumulating capital. In a context of financial uncertainty, bricks represent a supposedly safe value. “Safe as a house” is the kind of belief that allowed the occurrence of real estate bubbles all around the world until the Crash of 2007-2008. We are all aware of the subprime crisis which grew upon the American popular housing sector, but we know very little about the holyday home investments made during the same period. Yet, it is not exclude that they participated of the same speculative mechanisms. The type of investors involved, their connection with financial spheres, and the current underutilization these estates indicate that this business was more based upon exchange valued rather than use values.

In this paper, we study the effects of such a second housing spread in three touristic cities: Tibau do Sul (Brazil), Torrevieja (Spain) and Crans-Montana-Aminona (Switzerland). Although they belong to radically different regions (Torrevieja and Tibau are seaside resorts, Crans is a ski resort), all three destinations have experimented a spectacular urban growth due to second housing during the last decade. Presented to local deciders as an opportunity to rapidly increase tax incomes (through construction permits mostly) and employment, the social, economic and environmental costs of tourism urbanization on the long run are rarely addressed. By comparing three case studies (through qualitative and quantitative data), we aim to understand the underlying logics of such “urban regimes” (Stone, 1989) and discuss some solutions to govern second housing in a more sustainable and equitable way.