The paper assumes the Weberian perspective that bureaucratic insulation preserves the state from rent seeking interest groups, without denying, firstly, the importance of politics to control bureaucratic tendencies towards corporatism, and, secondly, the fact the state is an imperfect instrument far from the image of a benevolent and competent organization. It analyses the institutional isomorphic process that leads the decision-making on non-for-profit organisations’ tax relieve from a clientelistc and corrupted arena, the National Council of Social Assistance, to bureaucratic ministerial offices. The process, set up in 2004, after a police investigation over allegations of bribery to facilitate the conferring of tax relieve certificates target powerful religious organizations owning well known universities, educational groups and hospital complexes. During 2009 and 2010, the competence to confer certificates was transferred to bureaucratic departments inside three Ministries - Education, Health and Social Development. The paper describes the process, highlighting institutional isomorphism mechanisms that helped to shape this new type of relationship between state and society in Brazil.