Institutional Capacity Building remains a local prerogative in the development process and is determined by two sources. The first concerns the problem of institutional supply. Countries which have been dramatically moved towards integrated public market regulations (BRICS) have adapted to global networks. New “social institutions” have been formed to regulate labor reproduction based on territoriality and information based accounting practices (for inflation). Distribution networks as new “organizational” regimes control production. Countries such as Greece, with strong patronage politics, may seem to lack the required “state institutions” and civil society organizations to coordinate socio-economic exchanges to enhance the value chain in the EU system.
The other issue concerns the already embedded institutions which may be an obstacle to new ones. The way external and internal actors are articulated, in a usually asymmetrical politically relationship, may define the future of “redundant” institutions. Usually developing regimes define a legal plateau whereby the nominal and the effective refer to law and to social assemblages as administration. However such social assemblages to be constituted require local partnerships and the social economy to become the centre in state policy. A pro-poor capacity building constitutes the elemental driver for a social assemblage essential to steer sustainability. Usually socially undemocratic regimes rule by means of poverty governance by imposing to the excluded a system of private trade of their basic needs (health, education, transport). As a result of political patronage, Greece formed administrative silos which neither communicate horizontally nor cooperate among themselves.
This paper will focus on Greek labor and its organizational status in an advanced European Union. We will focus on two issues of key importance for social assemblages; the health system and the local rural development process.