Social Capital and Rational Choice in a Non Political Association

The paper will present the results of an ethnographical research made during 2013-2014 in a non political association (a sport club) in Mexico City. It will analyze how cooperation dynamics are produced in three levels: a) at the micro level, it is focused on the formation of bondings within close groups and networks; b) at the meso level, it will analyze the possibilities of cooperation and formation of social capital between networks, and therefore, the formation of bridges; and c) at the macro level of the association will analyze, taking into account the previous levels, the coordination of actions to address common problems. The paper will show that nevertheless – according to Coleman – it is rational to cooperate with others, the risk to advance trust does not bring the same outcome at the three levels. In fact, the relationship between social capital and strategic decisions vary according to the level. That variation is due to some extent by the degree of networks closure, by the extent of trust (including the association itself), and by the decision making institutional design of the association. Therefore, in each of the three levels there are different incentives to cooperate and different costs for desertion