Is the Rise of the Far Right Overstated? a Comparison of “Thick” and “Thin” Cases

Over the last ten years, the far right has made surges at the ballot box in democratic and semi-democratic countries (France, Italy, Germany, Brazil, Turkey, Hungary, Israel, Argentina, India). It has also shifted the center dramatically to the right in established democracies, as can be seen throughout Europe and North America. Furthermore, it appears to be either at the helm or growing in influence in countries without meaningful elections, such as Iran, Russia, and arguably China. However, unlike the interwar years, and despite all talk of an anti-cosmopolitan “nationalist International,” there seems to be no emergent fascist ideology and movement with a consistent line and a solid alternative to market economics and liberal democracy. As importantly, except in a couple of semi-peripheral cases (Turkey, Hungary, Israel), the far right has not been able to hold on to power for longer than ten years.

We need to ask: Is today’s far right incomparably weaker than interwar fascism, as its overreliance on memes, social media, and non-ideological leaders would seem to suggest? In fact, unlike Mussolini and Hitler, many of today’s leaders – e.g. Trump, Bolsonaro, Duterte – appear to have no durable social base. None of the mentioned contemporary leaders come from, or build, social movements and mass organizations.

Or, are Erdoğan, Modi, and Netanyahu more representative of what is to come, despite their current marginality to “generalizing” theorizations of the far right? Yet, even if they are, are they really (or about to become) as destructive and violent as interwar fascists? This paper seeks tentative answers to these questions by comparing “thick” cases of the contemporary far right with the “thinner” cases, and discussing to what extent either has the potential to build durable dictatorships and/or finalize ongoing ethnic cleansings.