The Fukushima Nuclear Accident: The Human Accident By Ineffectiveness of Safety Regulation

After the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accdent, in eastern part of Japan, not only evacuees but also all Japanese people faced risks of exposure to radiation. People got furious at, distrusted of, and disappointed at the national government, Tōkyō Electric Power Company (TEPCO), which owns the Fukushima power plant and is responsible for the accident, media, and nuclear experts. Innocent smiles had disappeared. Mothers got worried about their children’s safety and the level of contamination in foods, school lunches, water, homes, schools, swimming pools, the paths leading to schools, and playgrounds. Citizens had to be constantly aware of the level of radiation. They could no longer trust official government and media reports on “safety.”

The Fukushima nuclear accident revealed the mishandling of the power company and the central government in dealing with the accident, the failure of Japan’s risk culture and risk framing on nuclear energy, a chain of underestimations, and the ineffectiveness of safety regulation. The first immediate cause of the accident was an underestimation of the risk posed by tsunamis. The level of safety awareness among TEPCO and the regulatory agencies of the Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) and the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) was shallow. The NSC did not have safety review standards concerning tsunamis until the Fukushima accident. There was virtually no defense against tsunamis.

Typically, the government and utility companies shared the assumption that there was no need to prepare for a station blackout and failed to anticipate evacuation beyond a ten-kilometer radius. None of Japan’s electric power companies have anticipated a loss of all external power supplies and backup generators for more than thirty minutes. The NSC was responsible for neglecting the need to prepare for the possibility of a station blackout.