Threatening to Strike: How Swedish Unions Are Using Notice of Industrial Action

The labor movement is known for using strikes as a primary strategy to achieve its goals. However, we demonstrate that sometimes merely threatening to initiate industrial action can be just as effective as actually striking. While other social movements might use protest announcements to inform and mobilize their supporters or strategically pressure their targets for concessions, the procedure of striking is regulated by law in most context. In the Swedish case, examined here, every legal industrial action requires a notice of industrial action seven days prior to the strike. Each of these announcements signals a deadlock in the bargaining process and constitutes a credible protest threat within the ongoing labor dispute.

Using unique archival data of all announced and executed notices of industrial action by the Swedish labor movement over four decades, we show that about one-fourth of these threats were never carried out. Assuming that non-execution indicates that some goals were achieved (at least to some degree), we analyze which types of unions (public or private sector, large or small, male- or female-dominated), and under what conditions, are more likely to secure concessions through the threat of protest.

Unexpectedly, the results provide no support for the argument that the perceived costs of potential disruptions are crucial for securing concessions. Unions in the transport sector are more likely to follow through on their threats compared to those in other sectors. Over the past 40 years, the number of 'empty' threats has increased, indicating that the declining size of the Swedish labor movement has not diminished the likelihood of obtaining concessions from employers without resorting to actual industrial action.