Distrusting Disgust: The Role of Sanctions in a Trust Game

In this paper, we examine how disgust influences generalized trust, which is viewed as a rational decision. We also explore the mediating role of sanctions against opportunistic behavior on this relationship. Although there is extensive literature on the influence of emotions on trust, the effect of negative emotions like disgust has been barely studied. To test this possible effect, we first measure the disgust sensitivity of participants in the Trust Game (TG) using Haidt’s disgust scale. We find that those who are more disgust sensitive allocate less money to the trustee. Secondly, we examine whether induced disgust, compared to sadness and a neutral condition, leads to distrust. We show that induced disgust negatively affects trust, while sadness has no effect. However, the introduction of a sanction in the TG neutralizes the effect of induced disgust. This suggests that rational choice continues to impact the trustee’s decision even under the influence of disgust, further supporting the institutional approach to trust formation.