Institutional Conflicts in Urban Land Use: Land Regularization in Environmental Conservation Areas in Mexico City and São Paulo
In Mexico City, the city government avoided taking sides and delegated decision-making to a collegiate body of multiple actors. With the upper hand of environmentalists, the collegiate developed a complex procedure to assess environmental damage and implement mitigation. While inefficient in practice, it allowed the government to avoid blame and partially address both sides' concerns. In São Paulo, a pro-housing coalition of bureaucrats embedded in civil society pushed for legal changes, especially during the Workers' Party mandates. They leveraged political connections and partisan alignment at local and federal levels to override environmental rules and frame land regularization as environmentally beneficial.
In summary, the arrangement in Mexico City increased veto points, stalling land regularization, while in São Paulo, it decreased opportunities for opposition, streamlining and accelerating regularization in environmental conservation areas. This comparative analysis thus underscores how institutional arrangements and political dynamics shape the conflicts between environmental and social policies in urban governance.