From Words to Worlds: The Interplay of Testimonial Knowledge and Sociological Narratives
From Words to Worlds: The Interplay of Testimonial Knowledge and Sociological Narratives
Monday, 7 July 2025: 09:00
Location: ASJE028 (Annex of the Faculty of Legal, Economic, and Social Sciences)
Oral Presentation
In social epistemology, debates between reductionist and anti-reductionist accounts of testimonial knowledge have sparked discussions about the nature of belief and the role of social interactions in knowledge production. A central issue is the concept of social epistemic dependence, which emphasizes individuals' reliance on others and their broader social environment. This tension is particularly evident between the Enlightenment view of the fully autonomous epistemic agent and the anti-individualist perspective, which stresses interdependence. However, I argue that prominent social epistemologists such as Burge (1998), Goldberg (2020), and Greco (2021) inadequately define the “social” in their frameworks and overlook the empirical dynamics between social scientists and the testimonies they gather. While they attempt to reduce individual agency, they neglect the crucial connection between the social and material worlds. Additionally, it must consider how social scientists approach interlocutors in politically sensitive contexts. Moreover, they fail to address how knowledge is shaped through narratives—stories, experiences, and discourses that permeate communities. These narratives, from Kantian “hopes” to everyday gossip, are essential in forming collective identities and shaping shared understanding. This blind spot becomes especially problematic when considering epistemic subjects, such as migrants and refugees, who do not share common belief systems with the host community or the researcher. It raises questions about how epistemic dependence and testimony are addressed in these contexts. Sociological narratives, often built on testimonial knowledge, may even emerge from “Good Liars,” further complicating the issue. Thus, I contend that any anti-individualist account relying on a shared ground of belief is vulnerable to critique for neglecting epistemic unbalance, particularly in how marginalized subjects navigate new social contexts. A more robust framework must integrate the role of sociological narratives and recognize the complexity of knowledge production in diverse and unequal environments.