Agent-Based Modeling of Elite Support for Redistribution in Authoritarian Regimes: Linking Micro-Level Behavior to Macro-Level Outcomes

This paper employs an agent-based model (ABM) to examine the dynamics of ministerial support for social policies within the context of Morocco's authoritarian regime. The model examines the impact of professional diversity within the government and intra-cabinet competition on elite preferences for redistribution, with a particular focus on the decision-making processes of ministers. At the micro level, the ministers are conceptualized as agents operating under varying degrees of decision-making uncertainty and informational asymmetry. The behavior of each minister is driven by two mechanisms: regression to professional habitus when uncertainty is high and extrapolative anticipation when information is scarce. These individual-level mechanisms influence their support for social policies. At the macro level, collective outcomes emerge from the interactions of these micro-behaviors, which are influenced by the professional diversity of the cabinet and the intensity of intra-cabinet competition. The model posits that greater professional diversity engenders heightened attention to redistributive policies, whereas intense internal competition diminishes the prioritization of social issues. By empirically calibrating the ABM with data on Moroccan ministers, this study offers a novel approach to understanding how micro-level elite behaviors translate into macro-level policy outcomes in authoritarian settings with limited electoral accountability. The findings contribute to both the theoretical and empirical discussions on the integration of data into ABMs and the challenges of modeling elite behavior.