Populism and Practical Utopianism: Sociological Investigations of Reactionary and Progressive Formations

Populism is a disruptive social force breaking established relations and re-articulating them in many ways that can go beyond conservative and liberal formations. However, they can take reactionary and progressive forms as well as generate radical centrist populism. Sociology needs a combination of old and new conceptual tools to explain these events, including elite theory. We are witnessing the rise and spread of a ‘new authoritarianism’, one that has undone and undoing the third wave of democratization. The paper explores the different strategies and tactical responses (especially in a digital context) in specific cases, including Trumpism, Brexit, Brazil, the Philippines and Thailand. Particular attention is also be paid to the development of state structures designed to prevent left-progressive forms of populism from emerging and whether the state should be seen as a 'site of populist contestation'. This paper also explores the avenues available in the 21st Century for constructing progressive forms of populism that counter the appeal of rightist populist insurgencies in both developed and developing societies and regions. A progressive populism inevitably draws on the utopian tradition. Early utopianism constructed imaginative visions of social arrangements that directly addressed the problems of direct experience, from Thomas More through the Diggers to more contemporary movements such as deep ecology. Marxist strands of utopianism theoretically focused more on the division of labour between social classes although practical illustrations were much more than this, as with the political experiments of the Communards, early Soviets and factory councils. As a result, the radical-socialist antagonisms over utopian strategy have diminished the possibilities for a ‘left populism’, although the Corbyn phenomenon is potentially a useful exception. Such antagonisms need to be overcome socially rather than overcome either politically or economically. As a conclusion, the paper offers a diagnosis and prognosis for both reactionary and progressive populism.