Tolerant Solidarity from the Viewpoint of Normative Conflict

Monday, 16 July 2018
Distributed Paper
Kazuto MISUMI, Kyushu University, Japan
In this paper we formally discuss compositions of tolerant solidarity from the viewpoint of normative conflict. Defining solidarity as <we-relation> via net-base symbols (Schutz,1962), we formalize believes that represent what symbols are significant for <we-relation> in terms of Boolean equations. Tolerant solidarity is confronted with contradiction between universalism and relativism. Then, “less conflictual solutions” (LCS: Murakami,1994) will be an excellent guide for tolerance when we define it as restriction of normative conflict. In addition LCS works as the standard of tolerance in the acceptance process of meta-believes that specify desirable beliefs based on certain ideal goals. We consider 6 type meta-beliefs as indicated in the following Boolean equations. (Ragin,1987. We call each term in equations presentation pattern.)

(1) Liberal universalism: W=S(A+B)=SAb+SaB+SAB

(2) Universalism: W=Sab

(3) Homogeneous universalism: W=SAb、W=SaB

(4) Particularism: W=sAb、W=saB

(5) Relativism: W=s(A+B)=sAb+saB+sAB

(6) Privatized particularism: W=sab

Suppose that there is a group where members commonly accept concrete net-base symbols, A and B, for solidarity W; however, they are divided into two subgroups on acceptance of an abstracted net-base symbol, S. In this case, each sub-group may have 18 different types of belief in general. If a meta-belief is perfectly included in a belief, namely all the presentation patterns in the former also appear in the latter, a person who has the belief will not experience any conflict when accepting the meta-belief in question. Thus we examine tolerance of each meta-belief from the viewpoint of LCS, and will conclude that LCS does not guarantee that liberal universalism is the most tolerant meta-belief; however, it might best fit with tolerant solidarity because it holds moderate tolerance and a consistent ideal goal at the same time.

The above-mentioned analysis may suggest a general mechanism that explains acceptance and rejection of normative discourses.