The Suppression of Popular Protest in China

This paper examines state responses to social protests in contemporary China, thereby demonstrating the institutional logic of governance. The data source for this research is a database of more than 10,000 news events on mass protests from 2000 to 2015. Empirically, the main findings of this study include the following: (1) Between 2000 and 2015, the percentage of police responding to collective protests by force increased steadily; the police were more and more inclined to crack down on social protests. (2) The police’s suppression of protests in rural areas was the most serious, followed by those in second-tier cities, and last, by those in large cities. Police in large cities were the most tolerant of collective protests. (3) Erupting violence was one of the main factors leading to police attendance at protest scenes, as well as the arrest of protesters. (4) The larger the scale of a protest, the more likely the police were to appear on the scene. By contrast, the police were more inclined to arrest protesters at small protests. (5) Police responses were influenced first and foremost by who was protesting and not necessarily by the protest issues or targets. When protests targeted local governments (rather than central or provincial governments), or when protesters’ claims were administration issues or cadre-related, police were more likely to attend the protests and arrest protesters. The underlying reason for police attendance, however, was that the protesters were members of disadvantaged groups. The suppression of social protests by local governments varied for different people, issues, and areas. To pursue effective governance and protect the authority of the central government, local governments faced with collective protests habitually resort to modes of reaction that enable them quell protests quickly, while sacrificing the interests of disadvantaged groups, making the institutionalization of social conflicts impossible.