762.3
How Was the Cooperative Relationship in Trench Warfare Brought about?
a Sociological Analysis of Equilibrium in Repeated Game
This problem has been investigated as "noise problem" in evolutionary game. Axelrod has shown that revised strategies "Generosity TFT" and "Contrition TFT" which incorporate flexible response to noise (mistaken defection) are advantageous. However, analysis by evolutionary games is not appropriate for the cooperative relationship in trench warfare, since it was born by players' deliberate choice,
In this presentation, we investigate this cooperative relationship analytically focusing on player's subjective choice logic in repeated PD game. As a result, we show; (1) When disturbing noise occurs under a sufficiently high discount rate, the expected payoff of simple TFT strategy decreases and becomes lower than that of revised TFT strategies incorporating tolerance or contrition; (2) The superiority of those revised strategies is based, not on a mechanical application of Nash equilibrium, but on the subjective reason for keeping on those strategies; (3) And exchanges of "message" through individual choice of "moves" by both sides during the interaction play an important function for keeping the cooperative relationship.
These show that a certain cooperative relationship in trench warfare should be understood as a sociological relationship, not just as a mechanical application of game theory.