655.1 Movimientos democráticos en régimenes autoritarios de alta capacidad: Comparaciones desde el Medio Oriente, la Rusia, y la China

Saturday, August 4, 2012: 10:45 AM
Faculty of Economics, TBA
Oral Presentation
Hank JOHNSTON , Sociology, San Diego State University, San Diego, CA
This paper examines democratic opposition movements against authoritarian states in a broadly comparative perspective. It draws on examples of movements in numerous authoritarian states, but with special analytical focus on the prevailing strategies (Koopmans and Kresi 1998) of China, Russia, Iran, Egypt, Tunisia, Lybia, and Syria. The goal is to identify the generalizable processes of democratic mobilizations and state responses to growing demands for political openness. The analysis focuses on three dimensions of high-capacity authoritarian states: (1) diversity of elite interests, (2) the complexity and vertical structure of social control apparatus, and (3) the microlevel, quotidian reality of interaction between the political opposition and forces of social control.  Each has its own impact on the outcomes of protest mobilization at different junctures in the development of the opposition. Drawing on examples from several high-capacity authoritarianisms mentioned earlier, I identify junctures when elite interests may diverge, thereby creating opportunities for oppositional mobilization. Another goal is to identify patterns of challenge and threat when elite interests converge, thereby leading to increasing repressive measures. The dual principles of divergent elite interests and vertical state heterogeneity (as measures of state capacity), however, make broad generalizations difficult, as is apparent in variable outcomes of Arab democratic movements, and stalled democratization in China and Russia. The forces of political opposition and state repression are engaged in a “dark dance” that is dynamic, recursive, and iterative. Moreover, the complexities at different levels of the social control apparatus of high-capacity authoritarianism makes democratic outcomes highly contingent on elite adaptability.