Monarchical Corporatism: Cambodia, Iran, Jordan, and Thailand in Comparative-Historical Perspective

Scholars have long dismissed the development of labor institutions and corporatist systems in monarchical states. Yet, some current and ex-monarchies boast among the most generous labor rights in the world, and actively include worker groups in policymaking and administration. To address this puzzle, I develop a theory about labor incorporation under monarchical rule. I find that (i) the power of the king and (ii) contentious legitimacy threats help to explain variation in timing and degree of monarchical corporatism. Compared to its republican peer, monarchical corporatism limits worker organizational power, yet it is also associated with higher labor autonomy and widespread bottom-up mobilization. Based on a least-similar case design involving comparative-historical analysis of four countries in two world regions, the findings have significant consequences for our understanding of state-making, contentious politics, and labor movements.