Why Do Opt-out Movements Succeed (or Fail) in Low-Stakes Accountability Systems? a Case Study of the Network of Dissident Schools in Catalonia

In response to neoliberal reforms and driven by the 15M mobilizations, the Green Tide for Public Education in Madrid and the Yellow Tide in Catalonia emerged in 2011 with shared goals of defending public education and opposing privatization. This movement spurred new actors in the education field, leading to the formation of the Network of Dissident Schools in Catalonia during the 2014-2015 school year. This dissident movement opposed external standardized tests, organizing boycotts in over 80 schools with support from more than 1,700 families. This article presents a case study of the Network of Dissident Schools as an example of resistance to standardized tests in countries with low-stakes accountability systems. Standardized assessments based on student results are a contested policy in the education sector. Opt-out movements have emerged globally, particularly in high-stakes accountability systems, but little research has focused on soft accountability systems. This study examines the opt-out movement in Catalonia as an anti-standardization movement within a soft accountability framework. Using a case study approach, the research draws on semi-structured interviews with activists (n = 14) and key stakeholders (n = 3), along with document and press analysis (n = 25). The results shed light on the emergence and nature of the movement, the political opportunity structure, its discursive frames and the repertoires of collective action and tactics deployed by activists to influence public policies. In this sense, the opt-out movement in Catalonia identifies potential risks and adverse effects similar to those reported in high-stakes systems, developing a repertoire of collective action and discursive frames similar to other emerging anti-standardization movements in high-stakes contexts. The conclusions suggest that accountability instruments have a ‘life of their own’ beyond their policy design and highlight the difficulties of resisting and reversing such policy instruments once adopted.