Solution To Problem Of Free Rider Through Division Of Production and Sanction

Thursday, July 17, 2014
Room: 511
Yutaka NAKAI , Systems Engineering and Sciences, Shibaura Institute of Technology, Saitama, Japan
The meta norm (Axelrod 1986, Yamagishi 1990) is one of solutions to the problem of free rider in a collective goods production. The norm requires all persons to be engage in a production and a sanction at the same time. However, it seems impossible for a person to play both roles because one is different from the other as a professional job. So we suppose the division of roles meaning that a person can’t play both roles, and examined whether the division can solve the problem of free rider. Specifically, we introduce two kinds of players. One is a player who doesn’t engage in a production (that is, he/she doesn’t pay a production cost), focuses on a sanction against a free rider with a sanction cost, and is presented a payoff by the other role. We call the player the “guardian.” The other is a player who focuses on a production of collective goods with a production cost, doesn’t engage in a sanction against a free rider (that is, he/she doesn’t pay a sanction cost), and presents a payoff to a guardian. We call the player the “tributary.” With a guardian and a tributary in addition to a free rider, we executed evolutionary simulations to examine whether a guardian can exclude a free rider and a guardian and a tributary work together for mutual benefit. As a result, we found that the division of roles had established and the coalition could exclude a free rider. Especially, it is found that guardians account for up to the same rate of a society as a presented payoff divided by a total production, which reminds us of a kind of tax rate.