291.4
Collective Action and Collective Actors in Fields: Some Ontological Clarification of a Recent Debate in Neo-Institutionalism
We take the distinction between agency and actors immanent in theories of practice (especially in the work of Giddens 1984, even Latour 2005), as a point of departure to discuss this problem. Actors – individual as well as collective ones – are special constructions of western modernity (Luckmann 1980, Foucault 1984, Luhmann 1984, Meyer/Jepperson 2000). They are often confronted with the obligation to act consistently in line with different kinds of rationality, often stemming from different field-levels. Agency, in contrast, is the essential possibility to make a difference in the stream of daily activity (Giddens 1984: 9), which is grounded in mental control over bodily activities. Although agency and actors are often actualized in an intertwined form, they sometimes only occur in a loosely coupled way.
Following this conceptualization, we can offer a more complex and clarified picture of individuals and collectives. It allows for a clearer distinction between (a) the properties of individual and collective actors, and between (b) agency and attributed agency. In addition, it allows (c) for a more elaborate description of how fields are nested within fields, for example how agency and actors are constituted by fields at the same time as they constitute them.