How They Rule Latin America? Comparative Analysis of Corporate Interlock Networks in Several Latin American Countries

Research on corporate interlock networks around the world has revealed different network configurations across nations: cohesive networks in e.g., Italy and France, and dispersed networks in e.g., United Kingdom and Japan. Studies carried out showed that cohesive and dispersed networks are produced by different institutional contexts, which correspond to varieties of capitalism (Windolf 2002; van Veen and Kratzer 2011; Cárdenas 2012). However, this hypothesis seems not to fit in Latin America since institutional context (or capitalism) is similar (Phillips, 2004; Schneider, 2009), but corporate interlock networks differ between countries, e.g. cohesive network in Chile and dispersed in Argentina (Paredes 2011; Salvaj and Lluch 2012). The present research analyze, compare and explain the corporate interlock networks across Latin American economies in order to comprehend why corporate elites are interconnected by cohesive networks in some countries, and by dispersed networks in others. Research on corporate networks in Latin American has studied national economies separately and a systematic cross-national analysis is lacking in Latin America. Results obtained are also compared to previous research on corporate networks in developed countries. This paper contributes to theoretical debates on: corporate elite cohesion and economic organization (or variety of capitalism) in Latin America. At the methodological level, the project employ social network analysis to examine network configuration, and fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis, QAP regression and structural equation models to analyze the factors that influence network configuration. Findings reveal the impact of family ownership, protectionist laws, revolving doors and business group structures on corporate networks.