745.2
Stabilization of the World Due to the Expansion of a Western State System: Explanation Using Game Theory
Dr. David Strang explained the stabilization of modern global society from the perspective of the (sociological) new institutional theory while criticizing the explanations given by realists in highly original research ("Anomaly and Commonplace in European Political Expansion: Realist and Institutional Accounts." International Organization, vol.45, 1991). He states that global society has been stabilized as a result of the expansion and the “institutionalization” of a Western state system that respects the sovereignty of each country, rather than as a result of the balance of power of countries that reasonably maximize their utility.
However, his explanation seems still insufficient when we ask questions such as: why and how such an expansion took place; and why such an expansion stabilizes global society.
The answer can be derived from the fact of historical conflicts between dependencies and sovereignties. The form of the dynamic game between resisting/non-resisting dependencies and oppressing/non-oppressing sovereignties is analogous to that of the well-known chainstore game. This dynamic game has two Nash equilibriums. Based on the replicator dynamics of this game, we can interpret the historical changes in global society.
Initially, in a path-dependent manner, the world heads for an equilibrium that includes “dependencies that do not resist oppressive sovereignties.” During this period, empires vie for supremacy. Subsequently, global political discourse requires sovereignties to comply with a “commitment” to non-oppressiveness. The world then heads for a subgame perfect equilibrium in which “sovereignties do not oppress resistance from dependencies.” Thus, when the sovereign authority of many countries becomes established, “cooperation” will be selected in the repeated N-person dilemma game, resulting in a more stabilized global society. The term “institution” referred to by institutionalists can be understood as “commitment” or “equilibrium” in the game theory.