The Democratic Public and the Process of Experience. Towards a Pragmatist Theory of Recognition

Theories of recognition are an important approach for the development and normative foundation of a critical social theory. One central thesis is here that the formation of a positive personal identity depends on the affirmation by others in contexts of mutual recognition and that this affirmation is the decisive normative criteria for the constitution of social institutions. But insofar as this personal identity is in many cases only conceived as an identification of the actor with his own qualities and abilities, it follows that the social context, in which this positive personal identity is achieved, remains arbitrary. The trouble is here that the affirmation of a certain personal identity may than correspond to the existing expectations of the actor and ensure his integrity, but at the same also reaffirm the power relations of the social context, in which this identity was formed. In the second part of my paper i would like to develop an account oriented towards the social philosophy of pragmatism, which avoids these problems. Recognizing has to be conceived not as a affirmation of an already existing identity, but as a social process. In this process the actors and social groups are always confronted with unintended social consequences of their actions for others and are therefore led to a crisis and reformulation of their actual practical identity. And this holds not only on the level of the individual, but also on that of institutions. The democratic public is the realm in which a common elucidation of problematic social consequences of the existing institutions takes place. This elucidation is then the background for a critical reflection on, and a reformulation of the guiding norms of these institutions. In consequence critique refers to blockades of this process of experience, in which institutionalized rules are questioned and reformulated.