A Paradox of Coercive Power: Institutionally Founded Power Relationship and Rationality of Action

Reviewing the literatures on social power, it is found that so many different kinds of power concept as well as measures of magnitude of power have been proposed. Hence, without an appropriate specification of power concept, no meaningful analysis is possible. This research focuses on the coercive power which is defined as follows; an individual A is wielded a coercive power by B when A is forced to choose an action x which she/he would not choose if B’s action schedule following A’s action were somehow different. In other words, B forces A to choose x by preparing a punishment to A’s non-x choice. (Strictly speaking this is “negative” coercive power. There is also “positive” one in which B prepares a positive sanction to A’s choice of x.) This concept of coercive power involves individuals’ rational choice. A is forced to choose x because it is her/his rational choice under a given situation.

     It is frequently supposed that a power relationship is asymmetrical in which the power holder and the power subordinate are fixed. If A is the power subordinate in relation to B in one situation, this asymmetrical relationship applies to other situations. Especially, if the relationship is institutional, that is, if it is institutionally stipulated that B is entitled to control A’s action by preparing a punishment to A’s normatively deviant action, B is identified as the power holder in relation to A.

     However, there are paradoxical cases in which the presumed subordinate A can control B’s sanction schedule in such a way that B is forced to choose a sanction which does not punish A’s deviant action. This happens because B also has to choose the sanction rationally. This study shows the mechanism of this paradox and analyzes mathematically the conditions that this paradox emerges,