Meta Rational Choice Analysis of Social Action

Various behavioral models have been proposed to explain human behavior. However, it seems to be under way to create a general theoretical framework that deals with the models in a coherent way. This paper proposes a theoretical first step toward such a framework. More concretely, I propose a mechanism that shifts the two mode of rational action: Forward-looking rational action and backward-looking rational action. In conventional rational choice theory and game theory in particular the former model has been used. The model assumes that an actor chooses his/her action based on his/her calculation of expected utility. The backward-looking rational action model, in contrast, has been used in evolutionary game theory and assumes that an actor chooses his/her action based on his/her experience in the past. Although both of them are plausible models of human behavior, an actor uses both of them in reality. Suppose that a person catches a cold and needs to go to a doctor. Then he/she would visit his/her family doctor without serious consideration. Suppose, in contrast, that the person is diagnosed with lung cancer during an annual checkup. He/she would collect as much medical information on the cancer as possible and try to find the best doctor who would properly deal with the cancer. The same person uses the backward-looking rational action model in the first case and the forward-looking rational action model in the second case. In other words he/she swings between the two models. How do we explain this swing? My argument is that an actor chooses one of the two models depending on the cost of searching for the information and the benefit of the result of the search. I will try to generalize this idea and present a more comprehensive theoretical framework.