How Do Local Community Members Accept the Usage of Commons By Nonlocals in the Under-Used Commons? : An Approach Based on Agent-Based Simulation
This study examines the effect of usage rule of commons on welfare of local community members in under-use situation, using an agent-based simulation. Here, I consider three types of rules; (a) <Accommodate I>, which has entrance fee system by voluntary monitoring staff and the entrance fee share local community members evenly, (b) <Accommodate II>, which has entrance fee system but entrance fee is distributed among monitoring staff, (c) <Exclusion>, which exclude nonlocals by voluntary monitoring staff. The simulation shows that the difficulty of monitoring nonlocals determines the benefit of usage rule for local community members. First, <Accommodate II> operate in favor of local community members’ payoff when it is difficult for local community members to monitor nonlocals. Second, <Accommodate I> is more efficient than<Accommodate II> as the difficulty of monitoring is removed. Third, <Exclusion> works well when it is easy to monitor nonlocals.