Constitutional Supremacy and Political Conflict
Language: English and Spanish
The session will accommodate 4-5 papers and will also have a collective discussion.
The topic of the panel departs from the premise that Constitutional Democracies are not self-sustaining systems; instead, it is argued, Democracies are contingent systems, just like any other political system. It means that conflict and authoritarianism are as likely outcomes as democratic governance is. The panel aims at updating our understanding on the role of Constitutional Courts in the establishment and maintenance of Democratic governance; it also aims at improving our understanding of the current challenges faced by Constitutional Judges, and the threats to the function of Judicial Review. Recent political crises suggest that a country´s Constitutional Tribunal are vulnerable to authoritarian challenges in at least three ways: (1) on the appointment of its members, (2) on the operation of Constitutional Tribunals, (3) on the role of Judicial Review. These issues represent a problem of Legitimacy of Constitutional Justice The panel invites submissions that have used qualitative, quantitative or mix methodologies in addressing these issues; the panel also invites submissions that explore currents ways of interconnection amongst disciplines like Political Science, Law and Political Sociology on topics like Constitutional Supremacy, the principles of Division of Power, and Judicial Independence.